Abstract. We address the problem of Byzantine agreement, to bring processors to agreement on a bit in the presence of a strong adversary. This adversary has full information of the state of all processors, the ability to control message scheduling in an asynchronous model, and the ability to control the behavior of a constant fraction of processors which it may choose to corrupt adaptively.
Introduction
Random bits are used in computing to break symmetry, ensure load-balancing, find a representative sample, maximize utility, and foil an adversary. Unfortunately, randomness is difficult to guarantee, especially in a decentralized model where not all agents are guaranteed to be reliable. What happens if a hidden cabal generates bits that are not truly random? Can we detect and neutralize such behavior?
In this paper, we address this question in the context of a classic problem in distributed computing: Byzantine agreement. In the Byzantine agreement problem, n agents, each with a private input, must agree on a single common output that is equal to some agent's input. Randomization is provably necessary and sufficient to solve this problem, but past randomized algorithms required expected exponential time, in the model we consider.
Our model: We consider Byzantine agreement in the challenging classic asynchronous model. The adversary is adaptive: it can determine which processors to corrupt and what strategy these processors should use as the algorithm proceeds. Communication is asynchronous: the scheduling of the delivery of messages is set by the adversary, so that the delays are unpredictable to the algorithm. Finally, the adversary has full information: it knows the states of all processors at any time, and is assumed to be computationally unbounded. Such an adversary is also known as "strong" [3] . The major constraint on the adversary is that it cannot predict future coinflips, and we assume that each processor has its own fair coin and may at any time flip the coin and decide what to do next based on the outcome of the flip.
Communication Time in this model is defined to be the maximum length of any chain of messages (see [11, 3] ), and sending a message over the network is counted as taking 1 unit of communication time. In addition, we consider computation time by individual processors, which is measured in the usual way.
Our Result: In 2013 [17] , the authors gave the first algorithm in this model with expected polynomial communication time. However, this algorithm required exponential computation per processor. We improve that result to require expected polynomial computation and communication. Specifically, our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1.
Let n be the number of processors, then there is a t = Θ(n) such that the following holds in the asynchronous message passing model with an adaptive, full-information adversary that controls up to t processors. Byzantine Agreement can be solved in expected O(n 3 ) communication time, expected polynomial computation time per processor, and expected polynomial bits of communication.
We can describe the computational problem we solve here, roughly speaking, by a novel game between a neutralizer N and and detector D. (The actual problem is a bit more complicated.) The game is on an m × n matrix and proceeds in iterations, where m = Θ(n). N knows everything; D sees only the matrix. At each iteration, N's goal is to pick the values in its columns so that the sums of the selected rows of the matrix are close to 0. D is attempting to remove N's columns so that N will eventually fail. Let t be a small constant fraction of n.
Phase 1: N may take over ("claim") columns, provided that the total number of columns taken over during the game is less than t. Phase 2: All entries in unclaimed columns are independently set to the sum of n independent fair coinflips of value +1 and -1; each row is selected by an independent fair coinflip. Phase 3: N sets the values in its columns. Phase 4: D sees the matrix and, it may remove columns (for the next iterations), provided that the total number of columns removed during the game is no greater than 2t. D wins when N fails to satisfy its goal after Phase 3. Our strategy requires only O(n 3 ) computation time per iteration and N loses with constant probability after an expected O(n) iterations.
Note that the game may be viewed as a weighted bipartite graph with nodeset (R, C) where the weights on edges incident to unclaimed nodes in C are set randomly and the others are fixed by an adversary (N). The algorithm (D) must find a small superset of the claimed nodes. Our solution involves identifying a subgraph where the weights are higher than expected. Thus the problem can be viewed as an iterated version of finding a weighted planted bipartite subgraph. See the Related Work section.
Technical Overview
In our algorithm, each processor p maintains a set V p of processors that p accepts coinflips from. Initially V p contains all n processors. The algorithm proceeds in epochs, where each epoch is composed of m iterations of a variant of Ben-Or's algorithm. In each iteration, each processor broadcasts n coinflips, where heads is +1 and tails is -1. At the end of every epoch in which agreement does not occur, each processor p creates a m × |V p | matrix, M p , where M p (i, j) is the sum of the coinflips received in iteration i from processor j. For any fixed epoch, this matrix has two important properties.
• Property 1: For any good processor q, let s(i, q) be the sum of coinflips broadcast by q in iteration i. Then for any processor p, such that q ∈ V p , |M p (i, I q ) − s(i, q)| ≤ 3, where I q is the index associated with processor q.
• Property 2: There exists a set of θ(n) good processors P , such that for every p ∈ P , the following holds for a set, R, |R| = θ(m), of the rows of
where k is a fixed constant, and I B is the set of indices associated with bad nodes. Property 1 derives from our coin flipping algorithm, GLOBAL-COIN, from Section 3.2; see also Lemma 14. This algorithm has been modified slightly from the algorithm in [17] so that each processor now performs only polynomial computation.
Property 2 holds via the following argument. In each iteration, the sign ("direction") of the sum of the individual coinflips is used to generate a global coinflip for our variant of Ben-Or's algorithm(Algorithm 4). Ben-Or's algorithm has the property that, in each iteration, there is a "correct" direction. If the global coinflip has this direction, then all processors reach agreement in the next iteration. In any iteration, with constant probability, the absolute value of the sum of the coinflips of all good processors is more than 2kn and the sum is in the correct direction. In such a "good" iteration, the adversary must decrease the absolute value of the sum in order to prevent agreement from being reached. The adversary can only decrease the absolute value by kn via control of the asynchronous scheduler, so it must decrease by the remaining kn via the strategic setting of coinflips for bad processors. Intuitively, the set R, above, is the set of good iterations for processor p. See Lemma 19 for a detailed argument. Properties 1 and 2 were shown to hold in [17] . Our main contribution is to describe a new polynomial time algorithm PROCESS-EPOCH that uses these properties to detect bad processors from the accumulated coinflips. We now sketch this algorithm. Detecting Bad Processors: Imagine permuting the columns of M p so that M p = [B p G p ], where B p is a m × |B ∩ V p | matrix consisting of the columns in M p corresponding to the bad processors, and G p is a m × |G ∩ V p | matrix consisting of the columns corresponding to the good processors. From Property 2, we can prove that for all p ∈ P , the 2-norm of the matrix B p will be at least c 1 n for some constant c 1 (Lemma 6). By a standard result on the 2-norm of a matrix of random variables [1] , and by Property 1, we can show that, w.h.p., the 2-norm of the matrix G p will be at most c 2 n for a constant c 2 < c 1 (see Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 for details). The gap between c 2 and c 1 can be made arbitrarily large as the ratio t/n decreases (Lemma 5).
Our technique for detecting the bad processors relies on this gap between c 1 and c 2 . Specifically, let r p be the top right singular vector of M p . We show that if the gap between c 1 and c 2 is sufficiently large, the values r 2 p [i] for i associated with bad processors, will tend to be larger than the values r 2 p [j] for j associated with good processors. In particular, we can ensure that i∈I G r 2
, where I G is the set of indices whose columns map to good processors, and I B is the set of indices whose columns map to bad processors.
The algorithm that each processor p uses to detect bad processors then is simple. Initially, p sets cumdev p (q) to 0 for all processors q. Then at the end of each epoch, p computes a matrix M p for that epoch as described above. If the 2-norm of M p is at least c 1 n, then, for each processor q, p increases cumdev p (q) by r 2 p [q], where r p is the top right singular vector of M p . For all processors q such that cumdev p (q) now exceeds 1, p removes q from V p .
We show that, for any processor p, w.h.p., no more than t good processors are every removed from V p (see proof of Lemma 8) . Once it is the case that for every good processor p, all bad processors are removed from V p , and no more than t good processors are removed from V p , agreement is reached within an expected constant number of iterations. We can make the entire algorithm Las Vegas by ensuring that for every processor p, all cumdev p values are reset to 0 and V p is reset to all n processors, in the unlikely event that more than 2t processors are added to p's blacklist.
Paper Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work. In Sections 3.1, we present our modified version of Ben-Or's algorithm, MODIFIED-BEN-OR, which calls upon a coinflip algorithm we call GLOBAL-COIN. The GLOBAL-COIN procedure is presented in Section 3.2. In Section 4, we analyze properties of the coinflips generated and broadcast during the multiple calls to GLOBAL-COIN in an epoch. In Section 5, we describe PROCESS-EPOCH and analyze the spectral properties of the matrices M p described above. Section 6 discusses future directions and open problems.
Throughout this paper, we will use the phrase with high probability (w.h.p.) to mean with probability 1 − 1/n c for any fixed constant c.
Related work
Spectral Methods: Spectral methods have been used frequently to identify trustworthy and untrustworthy agents in decentralized systems. Perhaps one of the most prominent applications is identifying trustworthy web pages. The PageRank algorithm, of Page et al. [22] (which was inspired by the spectral-based Clever algorithm of Kleinberg [18, 10] ) is well-known as the basis by which Google ranks web documents. PageRank ranks web pages based on the top eigenvector of a stochastic matrix that describes a random walk over the web graph. This eigenvector corresponds to the stationary distribution of the random walk, and pages that have high probabilities in this stationary distribution are considered to be "authoritative" web pages. It is known that PageRank is relatively robust to adversarial attempts to thwart it by adding a small number of spurious links to the web graph [24, 4] .
The idea of PageRank is the basis of the eigentrust algorithm [15] (see also [23, 13, 24] ). Eigentrust calculates the stationary distribution (the top eigenvector) of a random walk in a trust graph, where an edge from processor i to processor j has weight w i,j that indicates how much processor i trusts processor j. Processors with high probabilities in this stationary distribution are considered trustworthy. Eigentrust also provides some protection against collusion by bad processors.
We note that, in a sense, our approach is the opposite of eigentrust. In our algorithm, processors with high absolute values in the top singular vector are not trustworthy. Intuitively, this is because in our algorithm, good processors have random coinflips, and so over time, the columns associated with these processors will have little "structure", which translates to a small absolute value in the singular vector.
Our neutralizer detector game shares some similarities with the hidden clique detection problem. In this problem, proposed independently by Jerrum [14] and Kucera [19] , a random G(n, 1/2) graph is chosen and then a clique of size k is randomly placed in the graph. Alon, Krivelivich and Sudakov [2] described a spectral algorithm that can find a clique, w.h.p., when k = Ω( √ n) [2] . Roughly, this algorithm 1) finds the second eigenvector of the adjacency matrix of G; 2) Sets W to be the top k vertices when the vertices are sorted in decreasing order by their absolute value in this eigenvector; and 3) Returns as the clique the set of all vertices of G that have at least 3k/4 neighbors in W . Byzantine agreement: The number of papers published on Byzantine agreement numbers well into the tens of thousands. We refer the reader to [3, 21] for a general overview of the problem. For conciseness, we focus here only on the classic asynchronous model, where the adversary is adaptive and has full information. We note that the full-information assumption makes the problem challenging. With cryptographic assumptions, it is possible to achieve Byzantine agreement in O(1) communication time and polynomial computation time, even in the asynchronous model when the adversary is adaptive (see e.g. [9] ).
The Byzantine agreement problem was introduced over 30 years ago by Lamport, Shostak and Pease [20] . In the model where faulty behavior is limited to adversary-controlled stops known as crash failures, but bad processors otherwise follow the algorithm, the problem of Byzantine agreement is known as consensus. In 1983, Fischer, Lynch and Paterson (FLP) showed that a deterministic algorithm cannot solve the consensus problem in an asynchronous model even with one faulty processor [12] .
In 1983, Ben-Or introduced randomization, where each processor can flip a random private coin, as a way to avoid the FLP impossibility result. His algorithm solved Byzantine agreement in communication time exponential in the number of processors, in the classic asynchronous model described above. His algorithm consists of multiple rounds in which each good processor tosses a coin. The communication time is proportional to the expected number of rounds before the number of heads exceeds the number of tails by more than t. Thus, in expectation, this algorithm has constant running time if t = O( √ n), but has exponential running time for t any constant fraction of n, up to t < n/5.
The resilience (number of faulty processors tolerated) was improved to t < n/3 in 1984 by Bracha [5] . The communication time remained exponential. This resilience is the best possible [16] .
In 2013, King and Saia gave the first algorithm for the classic asynchronous model running in expected polynomial communication time. Their algorithm required O(n 2.5 ) expected communication time and tolerated t < n/500. Unfortunately, the computation time was exponential. In this paper, we achieve expected polynomial communication and computation time. However, there is a cost. Our expected communication time increases to O(n 3 ) and our resilience decreases to t < .000028n. After c 1 n epochs, where c 1 is a constant, if no agreement is reached, the sets V p are reinitialized to V , and the algorithm is restarted from scratch.
The BYZANTINE-AGREEMENT Algorithm

Algorithm 1 BYZANTINE-AGREEMENT
1: while there is no decision, repeat do 2:
V p ← the set of all processors 4: for e = 1 to c 1 n {"p runs epoch e"} do 5: for i = 1 to m do 6: Run iteration i of MODIFIED-BEN-OR 7: end for
8:
Run PROCESS-EPOCH 9: end for 10: end while
MODIFIED-BEN-OR
In Ben-Or's 1983 algorithm, a global coin with exponentially small probability is created when each processor flips one coin and their values all coincide. Following [17] , we replace these individual coin tosses with a routine GLOBAL-COIN involving up to n coin tosses per processor. Below is a sketch of the algorithm. The complete MODIFIED-BEN-OR algorithm is found in [17] and in the Appendix B.
We refer to each iteration of the while-loop as an iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR. Note that some processors may participate in GLOBAL-COIN even though they do not use its outcome, to ensure full participation by good processors. In MODIFIED-BEN-OR, v p is initialized to be the processor p's input bit for Byzantine agreement.
Algorithm 2 MODIFIED-BEN-OR (sketch)
1: while not decided do
2:
For a constant number of rounds, exchange initial bits and messages about information received;
3:
Let x be the number of messages of support for bit b received:
Lemma 1 ( [6, 17] ). In an iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR with t < n/5:
(1) Either there is agreement in the current or next iteration, or all good processors run in GLOBAL-COIN. (2) If greater than 4n/5 good processors start with the same bit value v, then every good processors will decide on v in that iteration. In particular, if GLOBAL-COIN returns b (from Step 3(b)) to 4n/5 good processors then every good processor comes to agreement in the next iteration.
GLOBAL-COIN
The goal of GLOBAL-COIN (given in the Appendix, Section C) is to generate, with constant probability, a fair coinflip that is agreed upon by a large fraction of good processors, or to provide data which, after O(n) iterations, will enable individual processors to identify bad processors.
The algorithm requires each processor to repeatedly perform a coinflip where heads is +1 and tails is -1, and broadcast up to n of these coinflips. Upon receiving sufficiently many coinflips, each processor p computes the sum of coinflips received from each processor q ∈ V p , and then decides on the sign of the total sum of coinflips received.
The coinflipping occurs in n "rounds". Each processor flips no more than one coinflip per round, and does so after receiving confirmation that its coinflip from the previous round was received by sufficiently many processors. The round number is incremented only if a sufficiently large majority of processors receive the same coinflips for that round from the same large set of processors. The algorithm follows the one in [17] except that the process for incrementing the round number in that paper potentially involves a non-polynomial time computation. We replace that process by the efficiently computable "Spread" protocol in [7] . The full algorithm appears in the Appendix C.
The results of this section are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([17]
). If t < n/11 then GLOBAL-COIN has the following properties:
(1) There is a set S of n − 4t good processors which receive n coinflips generated by each of at least n − 2t good processors and receives all but 2 of the coinflips generated by the remaining t good processors, before deciding on the sign of the sum. We use the term "common coins" to refer to this set of at least n(n − 2t) + (n − 2)t coinflips generated by good processors that are received by all members of S. (2) All good processors p decide on a sum of the coinflips generated by each processor q ∈ V p which is within 3 of the actual sum of coinflips generated by q, before deciding on the sum of all the coinflips. (3) W.h.p. the absolute value of the sum of coinflips generated by any one good processor is less than c 3 n .5 ln n − 3 and if any processor p receives coinflips generated by a processor q with absolute value at least c 3 n .5 ln n, p removes q from from V p , for c 3 a constant.
Detection of Deviation
We describe the information recorded by each processor p after all the iterations of MODIFIED-BEN-OR in an epoch have been completed (Step 7 of BYZANTINE-AGREEMENT) by a matrix. Let M p denote the m × |V p | matrix such that M p (i, j) is the sum of coinflips received in the i-th iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR from processor j ∈ V p . Below we set α = 2n(n − 2t), β = α − 2t. The following lemma was substantially shown in [17] , except for a small improvement in the constants. The full proof is in the Appendix D Lemma 3. Assume that:
(1) t < n/36; (2) for each good processor p, the number of good processors in V \ V p is no more than t; and (3) agreement is not achieved in an epoch e. Then, w.h.p., there is a set of .026n good processors P such that for every processor p ∈ P , there is a set of bad processors B p,e ⊂ V p and a set of iterations I p,e , |I p,e | ≥ m = .002m, such that for every i ∈ I p,e ,
This leaves the computational problem for each processor in P of identifying a suitably sized submatrix each of whose columns sum to a number whose absolute value exceeds β/2. Finding such a set of processors with the requisite sums does not imply that the processors in the set are all bad, but it is a first step used in [17] , where that problem is solved in exponential computational time.
In the next section, we give a polynomial time algorithm for p to measure a processor's contribution to these sums as a means of deciding whether to remove that processor from V p .
Spectral Analysis of Coinflips
Throughout this section, we will be using the 2-norm of vectors and matrices. The 2-norm of a vector v is |v| 2 = i v 2 i . The 2-norm of a matrix M is |M| 2 = max |u| 2 =1 |Mu| 2 . We will drop the subscript 2 from all norms for notational clarity.
Recall that β/2 = 2n(n − 2t)/2 − t. From Lemma 19, let m be the number of iterations in an epoch, let P be the set of processors p such that p receives all the common coins and for each p there exists a set of m "good" iterations in the epoch such that the sum of coinflips r − received from bad processors in V p exceeds β/2.
The following is a restatement of Theorem 3 from Achlioptas and McSherry [1] . Theorem 2.
[1] Let M be a random m by n matrix such that M(i, j) = r ij where {r ij } are independent random variables and for all i, j :
The remaining lemmas in this section hold for any fixed epoch e.
Let G be a m by n−t matrix based on all coinflips broadcast by the good processors. Specifically, G(i, j) is the sum of the coinflips broadcast in the i-th iteration by the j-th good processor, if the absolute value of this sum deviation does not exceed cn .5 ln n; else it is 0. Corollary 1. For every > 0, for n sufficiently large,
Proof. Note that G(i, j) = r ij where r ij are independent random variables with r ij ∈ [−cn .5 ln n, cn .5 ln n], E(r ij ) = 0 and V ar(r ij ) = σ 2 ≤ n. Let α = 1 and > 0 in Theorem 2. Then for any positive constant , for n sufficiently large, the precondition of Theorem 2 is satisfied and the result follows.
For every good processor p, let G p be a m by |G ∩ V p | matrix, where G p (i, j) is the sum of the coinflips r-received by p in the i-th iteration from the j-th good processor in V p .
Lemma 4. Assume |G| ≤ (3 + ) n(m + n − t)). Then for all p, |G p | ≤ (6 + ) n(m + n − t).
Proof. Fix a processor p and let G p be the m by |V p | matrix obtained by omitting columns for j / ∈ V p from the matrix G. It is easy to see that |G p | ≤ |G|. By Lemma 14, |sum p (q) − sum(q)| ≤ 3. Hence G p = G p + A where all entries of A are integers between -3 and 3. Clearly, |A| ≤ 3 √ mn. We thus have |G p | = |G p + A| ≤ |G p | + |A| ≤ |G| + 3 √ mn and the result follows by Corollary 1.
For a given processor p, let B p be an m by |V p ∩ B| matrix where B p (i, j) is the sum of coinflips r-received by p in the i-th iteration from the j-th bad processor in V p .
For the remainder of the paper, we assume t is sufficiently small so that (6 + ) n(m + n − t) < (1/k)(β/2) m /t, e.g., t < 
Proof. By Lemma 4, |G p | ≤ (6 + ) n(m + n − t). Then we have:
For any processor p ∈ P , let t p be the number of bad processors in V p . Then
Proof. Let x be a length t p unit vector, where all entries equal 1/ √ t p . Consider the vector y = Bx.
Note that for at least m entries of y, the square of the value of that entry is at least (β/2) 2 /t p . Hence |y| ≥ (β/2) m /t p ≥ (β/2) m /t. The second inequality follows from Lemma 5.
Recall that M p is the m by |V p | matrix such that M p (i, j) is the sum of the coinflips r-received by processor p in the i-th iteration from the j-th processor in V p . For simplicity of analysis, we assume that the columns of M p are arranged so that the columns for the t p bad processors in V p are to the left of the columns for the n p − t p good processors. We note that this rearrangement is equivalent to multiplying M p by a permutation matrix and so will not effect the singular values of M.
We thus let Lemma 7. Assume |G| ≤ (3 + ) n(m + n − t)). Then for every processor p such that |M p | ≥ (β/2) m /t, |g p | 2 < |b p | 2 /2. In particular, this holds for all p ∈ P .
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that |g p | 2 ≥ |b p | 2 /2. Note that |g p | 2 + |b p | 2 = |r p | 2 = 1. Thus, we have
This implies that |b p | 2 ≤ 2/3 or |b p | ≤ 2/3. We further note that
Putting this together, we have:
by Lemmas 5 and 6
which is clearly a contradiction. In the above inequalities, the third line follows by the CauchySchwartz inequality, and the last line follows for k > √ 3/( √ 3 − √ 2) = 5.45.
Lemma 8. With probability at least 1/2, Algorithm 1 will terminate successfully in 84t epochs, each consisting of m = 2n iterations, with resilience t < β 2 m 4k 2 (6+ ) 2 nm = 2n * .002m/(4 * 30 * 36nm) = .000028n. When the algorithm terminates, all processors will achieve Byzantine agreement. The algorithm is Las Vegas with expected 2 * 84tm < n 2 iterations of modified Ben-Or's algorithm for a total of O(n 3 ) rounds of communication and polynomial time computation.
Proof. Note that with probability 1 − 1/(m + n − t) − 1/n c , every iteration in an epoch will be such that |G| ≤ (3 + ) n(m + n − t).
We first claim that no more than t good processors are ever removed from V p for any processor p. First, observe that each processor v is removed from V p when cumdev p (v) ≥ 1. Each epoch can add no more than 1 to this total for any processor. Hence, the maximum cumdev p accrued by a processor before its removal is less than 2. Assume to the contrary that more than t good processors have been removed from V p , then i∈G cumdev p (i) > t. But in any epoch where processor p adds to the cumdev values, it must be the case that |b p | 2 ≥ 2|g p | 2 , and so the increase in cumdev p values for processors in B is twice the increase of cumdev p values for processors in G. Thus, i∈B cumdev p (i) > 2t. Since there are no more than t bad processors, this implies that for at least one bad processor i, cumdev p (v) > 2, giving a contradiction.
We next show that all bad processors will be removed from each V p for all p ∈ G in O(n) epochs. By Lemma 6, w.h.p. in every epoch which does not terminate, there are .052 * .048n > .024n = θ(n) processors in P such that |M p | ≥ |B p | ≥ β/2 m /t, thus the value of i cumdev p (i) must increase by 1 for each of these processors in P . Thus, p i cumdev p (i) must increase by .024n in each of these epochs. As shown above, at most t good processors can be removed from V p . Thus, once p v cumdev p (v) > n2t all bad processors are removed from each V p for all p ∈ G. If the conditions for Lemma 6 hold in each epoch that does not terminate, then there will be 2tn/.024n ≤ 84t epochs.
Set c 1 n = 84t as the number of epochs needed to remove all bad processors and let m = 2n > 2c 1 n. Then with probability at least 1 − c 1 n/(m + n − t) − c n/n c > 1/2, the entire algorithm will successfully run for c 1 n epochs until all bad processors are removed. Then it will succeed w.h.p. in the next epoch. If this fails to occur, it will repeat until Byzantine agreement is decided, making the algorithm Las Vegas. We can analyze computation time per processor as follows. Each round of GLOBAL-COIN requires O(n 2 ) computation to process up to n coinflips and received coinflip messages. After each epoch the computation of the singular value decomposition requires O(n 3 ). Thus the total computation time is dominated by the cost of MODIFIED-BEN-OR, for a total expected cost of O(n 5 ).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have described an algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement in polynomial expected communication time and computation time. Our algorithm works in the asynchronous message-passing model, when an adaptive and full-information adversary controls a constant fraction of the processors. Our algorithm is designed so that in order to thwart it, corrupted nodes must engage in statistically deviant behavior that is detectable by individual nodes. This suggests a new paradigm for randomized distributed computing: the design of algorithms which force attackers into behavior which a good processor might possibly engage in but is statistically unlikely, and which is detectable in polynomial time.
Our result leaves much room for improvement, in terms of the resilience and expected communication time. Can the resilience be increased to the optimal bound of t < n/3? Can we decrease the expected communication time to O(n 2.5 ) as achieved in [17] but with polynomial time computation? An intriguing open question is whether the expected communication time can be brought down to the known lower bound ofΩ(n) or whether Byzantine agreement is intrinsically harder than consensus, in terms of time or step complexity.
Appendix A. Introduction
The material here is substantially contained in [17] , with the exception of some improved constants, and the use of the Spread routine from [7] in GLOBAL-COIN, making it computable in O(n 2 ) time.
Appendix B. MODIFIED-BEN-OR algorithm
We now describe MODIFIED-BEN-OR, a slight modification of Ben-Or's algorithm for Byzantine agreement [6] .
We refer to each iteration of the while-loop as an iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR. The only change to Ben-Or's protocol is that instead of flipping a private coin, a processor uses a coinflip generated by the algorithm GLOBAL-COIN. The GLOBAL-COIN algorithm takes as an argument the iteration number of MODIFIED-BEN-OR and attempts to generate a fair global coin for that iteration; we describe GLOBAL-COIN later as Algorithm 5.
Note that some processors may participate in GLOBAL-COIN even though they do not use its outcome, to ensure full participation by good processors. In MODIFIED-BEN-OR, v p is initialized to be the processor p's input bit for Byzantine agreement.
Algorithm 4 MODIFIED-BEN-OR
while not decided do 3: send the message (1, k, v p ) to all processors; 4: wait until messages of type (1, k, * ) are received from n − t processors; 5: if there are more than (n + t)/2 messages of the form (1, k, v) then wait until messages ,of type (2, k, * ) are received from n − t processors; 11: if there are more than (n + t)/2 D-messages of the form (2, k, v, D) then 12: decide v; 13: else if there are at least t + 1 D-messages (2, k, v, D) then 14: run GLOBAL-COIN(k) but set v p ← v; 15: else 16: v p ← GLOBAL-COIN(k); 17: end if 18: k ← k + 1; 19: end while
The following lemma follows from the result in [6] .
Lemma 9 (Ben-Or [6] ). In an iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR with t < n/5:
(1) If greater than 4n/5 good processors have the same vote value v, then every good processors will decide on v in that iteration. 
Appendix C. GLOBAL-COIN
The algorithm makes use of the reliable broadcast primitive from Bracha [8] . In this primitive, a single player calls broadcast for a particularly message m, and subsequently, all players may decide on exactly one message. The reliable broadcast primitive guarantees the following:
(1) If a good player broadcasts a message m, then all good players eventually decide m.
(2) If a bad player p broadcasts a message then either all good players decide on the same message or no good players decide on a message from p. The algorithm assumes that all broadcasts are reliable broadcasts; we use the word broadcast to refer to reliable broadcast, and the word r-received to refer to deciding on a message which was reliably broadcast. The algorithm has the following types of messages.
• coinflip message (p, c, i): broadcast by processor p when p generates its i-th coinflip that has value c • received-coinflip message (p, q, c, i): broadcast by processor p when p r-receives the coinflip message (q, c, i) • release message, (p, i): sent by processor p only to processor q after p r-receives n − t received-coinflip messages of the form (R, q, c, i) • received-sum message: broadcast by processor p once it completes the last round of the algorithm. This message consists of n values: for each processor q, there is a value giving the sum of all coinflips that p received for q In the algorithm, i p is the number of coinflips p has generated to completion, and j p is the number of rounds which p has observed to completion.
C.1. Analysis of GLOBAL-COIN
Lemma 10. In GLOBAL-COIN, every processor will eventually decide a value of the global coinflip.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of rounds. We will show that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, if all good processors reach round j, then all good processors will reach round j + 1. The lemma then follows since a processor decides a value of the global coinflip as soon as it reaches round n + 1.
For any processor p, there are two conditions that must be satisfied for p to advance from round j to round j + 1. The first is that the processor is not in the WAIT state of Step 1; the second is the condition in Step 2.
The first condition will always eventually occur for any processor p. To see this, note that if there is some coinflip c, and some k ≤ j, and p has r-received at least t + 1 received-coinflip messages of the type ( * , b, c, k), then at least one good processor has r-received the coinflip message (b, c, k). Thus eventually, p will r-receive the coinflip message (b, c, k). Hence, for the remainder of this proof, we focus solely on the condition of Step 2.
Assume all good processors reach round x. We note that if one good processor then reaches round x + 1, that all good processors will eventually reach round x + 1. To see this, let p be one of
Algorithm 5 GLOBAL-COIN
Assumptions: Below, i, j are understood to mean i p and j p . Initially i, j ← 0. Let c 3 be a constant which we set in the proofs of Lemmas 14 and ??).
1: {Coinflip:} a) Whenever i ≤ j and p has not yet initiated the i th coinflip, then p flips a coin c and broadcasts the coin flip message (p, c, i) {"p initiates the i th coinflip"} and all the coinflips it has previously r-received. b) p does not participate in a coinflip broadcast (q, c, i ) unless it has r-received (q, c, i") for all i" < i . c) Whenever p r-receives a coinflip message (q, c, i ), then p broadcasts the received-coinflip message (R, q, c, i ) and a list of all the received-coinflip messages it has r-received in any round. d) For every received-coinflip message (q, c, i ) included on t + 1 lists which p receives, p waits until it r-receives (q, c, i ). e) Whenever p r-receives n−t received-coinflip messages (R, q, c, i ), then p sends to q the release message (p, i ). 2: {Round:} a) For round j, when there are n − t processors q such that p has received n − t r-receivedcoinflip messages (R, q, c, j) for the j th round coinflip message sent by each q, p broadcasts these messages as a set. b) p participates in the broadcast of a set only if p r-received every one of its messages. c) p waits until it r-receives sets from n − 2t processors such that for every message in these sets, p r-received the same message. Then p increments j. {"p completes a round"} 3: {Terminate:} If j = n + 1 then a) p broadcasts a received-sum message containing for each processor q, the sum of the coin flips that p received from q and waits until receiving such messages n − t other processors. b) p broadcasts a received-sum message containing for each processor q, the sum of the coin flips that p received from q. c) p waits to r-receive received-sum messages from n − t other processors. d) For each processor q and value x between −n and n, p sets vote p (q, x) to the number of processors from the previous step that claim that the sum of coinflips they received from processor p is equal to x. e) For each processor q, p determines if there is a value −c 3 n .5 ln n ≤ x ≤ c 3 n .5 ln n such that vote p (q, x − 1) + vote p (q, x) + vote p (q, x + 1) ≥ n − 5t. If so, sum p (q) ← x, for the smallest such x. If not, q is removed from the set V p . f) p sets the value of the global coinflip to the sign of the sum of the values sum p (q) over all processors q ∈ V p . Then p stops broadcasting messages, but continues to participate in the reliable broadcast of messages sent by other processors.
the good processors that eventually reach round x + 1. This implies that p satisfied the condition of Step 2, namely p r-received each message in the set. By the property of the broadcast, any other processor q will eventually r-receive any message r-received by p. Hence, q will satisfy the condition. We now show that at least one good processor will eventually reach round x + 1 ≤ n + 1, given that all good processors have reached round x. Assume not. Then all good processors are stuck in round x indefinitely. While this is true, for any good processor p that has broadcast coin flip i ≤ x, the coinflip message (p, c, i) will eventually be r-received by every good processors q. Then at least n − t processors q will broadcast the received-coinflip message (R, p, c, i), which will eventually be received by all good processors q , which will send a release message (q , i) to p. Thus, p will eventually complete its i-th coin toss, for all i ≤ x.
Assuming to the contrary that no processor has completed round x < n + 1 and advanced to x + 1, and using what we have shown, that all processors will eventually reach round x, then all good processors p will successfully complete the following: broadcast their x-th coinflip; the coinflip message (p, c, x) will be r-received by all good processors; all good processors q will broadcast the received-coinflip message (R, p, c, x); and all processors will r-receive these coinflip messages (p, c, x), and received-coinflip messages, (R, p, c, x) . Thus for any good processor g there will be a set of size n − t. Hence, g will advance to round x + 1, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 11. There is a set S of processors of size n − t such that n − 2t good processors that r-receive n coinflips from all processors in the set before they set their value of the global coin.
Proof. By Lemma 10, all processors eventually decide the value of the global coin. Let p be the first good processor to do so. By the condition of Step 2, p has r-received n − 2t sets at least one from a good processor which implies that at least n − t processors participated in the broadcast of that set. Therefore at least n − 2t processors r-received the n th round coinflips in that set before p completed the round and set the global coin. A processor which r-receives the n th round coin flipped by a processor must also have r-received its previous coins.
Lemma 12.
Consider the coinflip messages broadcast by processors in the set V \ S, where S is as defined in Lemma 11. There is a set of n − 2t good processors that r-receive, before they set their value of the global coin, all but possibly two coinflip messages broadcast by each good processor in V \ S.
Proof. Order the coinflip messages of good processors by when their broadcasts are begun.
Let b 1 and b 2 be the last two coin flip messages broadcast by processor B, where processor B is chosen over all good processor to maximize the time t that b 1 was broadcast.
Let t be the time of b 1 's broadcast. Consider any other good processor A which broadcasts at least three coinflip messages. All but one of these were broadcast at time no later than t. Let a 1 and a 2 be the last two coinflip messages broadcast by A at time no later than t. Let S a 1 and S b 1 be the sets of processors which broadcast release messages for a 1 (resp. b 1 ) before a 1 (resp. b 1 ) were completed. Let R b 1 be the set of processors which broadcast received-coinflip messages for b 1 .
Then since the broadcast of a 2 occurred by time at most t, every processor in S a 1 received receivecoinflip messages for a 1 from n − t processors by time t. Clearly all broadcasts of received-coinflip messages for b 1 occurred after time t. Since |S a 1 | ≥ n−t and |R b 1 | ≥ n−t, then |S a 1 ∩R b 1 | ≥ n−2t, of which at least n − 3t are good processors.
Note that each processor in S b 1 received received-coinflip messages for b 1 from n − t processors in R b 1 , and that there are at least n − 3t good processors in S a 1 ∩ R b 1 . Thus, at least n − 4t > t of the received-coinflip messages for b 1 that are received by each processor in S b 1 contain the receivedcoinflip messages for a 1 and all previous coinflips by processor A since by Step 1, every broadcast by a processor of a received-coinflip contains a set of all coinflips which have been r-received by that processor, and if this set includes a 1 , it include all previous coinflips by A.
Therefore every processor in S b 1 will wait to r-receive a coinflip message for a 1 before computing its sums. Hence all processors in S b 1 will r-receive all but possibly two coinflip messages of every good processor. This will occur before each of them sets their global coinflip, as it occurs before they send a release message for b 1 .
Fix a set S of n − 2t good processors from Lemma 11, and another set S b 1 of n − 2t good processors from Lemma 12. There are at least n − 4t good processors in the intersection of these two sets. This new set of good processors has r-received all coinflips of good processors which were D.1. Useful lemmas about the distribution of coinflips We use the following facts about distributions of random coinflips: Fact 1: (Chernoff): Let X be the sum of N independent coinflips. Then for any positive a, P r(X ≥ a) ≤ e −a 2 /2N . Fact 2: Let X be the sum of N independent coinflips. Let Φ(a) = 1/ √ 2π
By Fact 2 and the symmetry of +1's and -1's:
Lemma 15. A set of at least n(n − 2t) good coinflips has a deviation of α = 2n(n − 2t) in any specified direction with probability at least 1/20.
Lemma 16. A set of no more than nt good coinflips has a deviation of more than β/2 = 2n(n − 2t)/2− t with probability at most e −(β/2) 2 /2tn . If t < n/36, then β/2 > 23n/36 and this probability is at most e (−.638n) 2 /(2n 2 (1/36)) < e −11 .
D.2. No agreement implies unusual deviation by bad processors
In this subsection, we assume no more than t good processors have been removed from V p for any p and show that w.h.p., a failure to come to agreement over a large number of iterations implies there is a large subset of iterations where there are coinflips broadcast by bad processors with unusually high deviation. For each iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR, there is a particular value for the global coin toss (1 or -1) which will result in agreement. We call this the correct direction. We now show that for a large majority of processors p, there are many iterations with high deviation of coinflips by good processors in V p in the correct direction.
Lemma 17. Assume that the number of good processors in V \ V p is no greater than t for all processors p. Then, with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(n) , in m ≥ n iterations of MODIFIED-BEN-OR, there are at least m = .048m iterations I with the following property. For each iteration i ∈ I: (i) the deviation of coinflips of all good processors in iteration i is at least α in the correct direction; and (ii) there is a set of good processors S of size greater than .99n − t such that for all p ∈ S , the set of good processors in V \ V p generate coinflips with deviation less than β/2 in the correct direction.
Proof. Fix a processor p. Since V \ V p has less than t good processors, Lemma 16 shows the probability that the deviation of the coinflips of these good processors in V \ V p exceeds β/2 is less than e −11 in any fixed iteration. Hence, in any fixed iteration, the expected number of processors p such that the good processors in V \ V p have deviation exceeding β/2 is less than (n − t)e −11 .
Consider the event that at least ne −5 < .01n processors p have good processors in V \ V p with deviation exceeding β/2 in one iteration. By Markov's Inequality, the probability of this event is less than e −6 . Hence the expected number of iterations in which this event occurs is at most me −6 . Let X be the number of iterations in which the event occurs. Since each iteration is independent, we can use Chernoff bounds to bound X: P r(X ≥ (1 + e −2 )me −6 ) = e −me −10 /3 . This implies P r(X ≥ .003m) ≤ e −Ω(n) .
Let Y be the number of iterations in which all good processors have deviation in the correct direction of at least α. From Lemma 15, E(Y ) is at least m/20. Using Chernoff bounds, P r(Y < (1 − e −4 )m/20) = e −me −8 /40 . This implies P r(Y < .049m) ≤ e −Ω(n) . Then by a union bound, P r(X < .003m) and Y ≥ .049m) is 1 − e −Ω(n) . But if both X < .003nm and Y ≥ .049m, then there are at least Y − X > .048m iterations satisfying conditions (i) and (ii).
The next lemma shows that if the conditions above hold, and the deviation of the coinflips by bad processors is low, agreement will result. Lemma 18. Fix an iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR. Let S be the set from Lemma 2 of good processors which receive the common coins in the execution of GLOBAL-COIN in that iteration. Let G ⊆ S with |G| > 4n/5. If: (i) the coinflips of all good processors have deviation at least α in the correct direction; and (ii) for every p ∈ G, the coinflips of good processors in V \ V p have deviation less than β/2 in the correct direction; and (iii) for every p ∈ G the coinflips which are r-received by p and broadcast by bad processors in V p have deviation less than β/2; then the processors in G will agree on a global coin in the correct direction, and all processors will come to agreement in the next iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that the correct direction for the global coin is +1, which corresponds to the bit value 1 in MODIFIED-BEN-OR.
By Statement (1) of Lemma 2, the processors in G will receive all coinflips generated by good processors except at most 2 coinflips from each of as many as t good processors. Hence the adversary may cause at most a 2t change in deviation in the distribution of these otherwise random coinflips r-received from good processors. If in addition, the deviation of the coins from good processors in V \ V p is less than β/2, and the deviation of the coins from bad processors which each processor in G r-receives is less than β/2, then the sum of the coinflips which each processor in G uses to compute the global coin is greater than α − β − 2t = 0.
Thus, the global coin will be in the correct direction for all processors in G. Hence each processor p ∈ G will either ignore the global coin and set v p = 1, or will set v p to the outcome of GLOBAL-COIN which is also 1. Since |G| > 4n/5, the next iteration of MODIFIED-BEN-OR will result in Byzantine agreement.
The next lemma gives processors a tool for singling out processors which are exhibiting unusually high deviation.
Definitions: Let isum p (v, i) be the sum of coinflips by v r-received by p in iteration i. We define the direction in an iteration i for a set X of processors and a processor p as follows: dir p (X, i) is 1 if v∈X isum p (v, i) ≥ 0, and −1 otherwise.
We define processor p's view of the deviation in an iteration i for a set X of processors as follows:
Lemma 19. Assume that: t < n/36; for each good processor p, the number of good processors in V \ V p is no more than t; and agreement is not achieved in an epoch e. Then, w.h.p., there is a set of .026n good processors, P such that for every processor p ∈ P , there is a set of bad processors B p,e ⊂ V p and a set I e of greater than m = .002m of "good" iterations in epoch e such that for every iteration i ∈ I e , idev p (B p,e , i) ≥ β/2. Also there is at least one processor which observes this in .004n iterations.
Proof. By Lemma 17, w.h.p., there is a set J of .048m iterations which satisfy precondition (i) of Lemma 18 and for each such iteration, there is a set S of more than .99n − t good processors which satisfy precondition (ii) of Lemma 18. By Lemma 2 part (1), there are no more than 4t good processors which are not in S as defined in the statement of that lemma. Thus for each iteration j ∈ J, there is a set G j ⊆ S ∩ S , of more than .99n − t − 4t = .99n − 5t good processors such that precondition (ii) of Lemma 18 is satisfied for all p ∈ G j .
